Seinfeld’s “The Wig Master” Figures in Tom Clancy Decision

[WSJ_law_blog]

Jerry Seinfeld attends the premiere of “Sex and the City” at Radio City Music Hall in New York. (AP/Evan Agostini)

The justices of the Maryland Court of Appeals, the state’s highest court, are “Seinfeld” fans. Not that there’s anything wrong with that.

Yesterday, in a 50-page ruling on a dispute between author Tom Clancy and his ex-wife, Wanda King, over whether Clancy violated his financial responsibility to King when he removed his name from a book series, Justice Glenn Harrell, writing for the majority, launched into a lengthy disquisition comparing the contract issue at stake to a “Seinfeld” episode called “The Wig Master.”

Ultimately, the court held there was “potentially competing evidence” as to whether Clancy acted in good or bad faith and sent the case back to the lower court. But in footnote 27 it offered the following bit of guidance:

Jerry Seinfeld, perhaps an unlikely legal illustrator, once epitomized the duty of good faith in contract. In an episode of his television show, Jerry’s character purchased a jacket at a men’s clothing shop. The terms of the contract permitted Jerry to return the item for refund at his discretion. When Jerry attempted to return the jacket after an unrelated personal quarrel with the salesman, the following discussion took place.

Jerry: Excuse me, I’d like to return this jacket.
Clerk: Certainly. May I ask why?
Jerry: For spite.
Clerk: Spite?
Jerry: That’s right. I don’t care for the salesman that sold it to me.
Clerk: I don’t think you can return an item for spite.
Jerry: What do you mean?
Clerk: Well, if there was some problem with the garment. If it were unsatisfactory in some way, then we could do it for you, but I’m afraid spite doesn’t fit into any of our conditions for a refund.
Jerry: That’s ridiculous, I want to return it. What’s the difference what the reason is? . . .

In attempting to exercise his contractual discretion out of “spite,” Jerry breached his duty to act in good faith towards the other party to the contract. . . .